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Exercising Dominion Over 
Metropolitan Growth: 
A CASE STUDY OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA 
Jane McCollough 
College of Charleston 
William V. Moore 
College of Charleston 
Post World War II metropolitan growth created chal-
lenges for cities as suburbanization depleted the re-
sources of the municipality . The growth also contributed 
to political conflict as rival jurisdictions sought to 
maintain or extend dominion over that growth. The con-
flict and success of the dominion strategies are affected 
by laws governing annexation and incorporation and by 
urban regimes . Although annexation statutes may be re-
stri ctive, a city that is willing to test the limits of the law 
an d pursue aggressive annexation policies may success-
fully challenge rival jurisdictions and thereby extend its 
dominion. 
INTRODUCTION 
Metropolitan growth can be attributed to several factors 1 and as metropolitan areas expand, central cities, edge cities, and suburbs frequently must make political deci-
sions to exercise dominion over new development. Because pat-
1See for example summaries in Nancy Kleniewski, Cities, Change, and Conflict, 
Belmont , CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company (1997); John J. Macionis and Vincent N. 
Parrillo, Cities and Urban Life. Upper Saddle River, NJ : Prentice Hall (1998); and Phil-
lips, Barbara, City Lights, New York, NY: Oxford University Press (1996) . 
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terns of urban development are not "preordained," community 
leaders can pursue multiple strategies to secure the advantages of 
dominion, including influence over land use and access to eco-
nomic resources (Hoch 1984; Rusk 1993). Although leaders may 
cooperate to guide development, municipal governments often 
seek to extend their jurisdiction through annexation. Conflict 
arising from competing interests is often a function of urban re-
gimes and laws that govern annexation and incorporation. 
Post World War II suburban growth created challenges 
for established cities throughout the nation and contributed to 
declining city-center economies, :fragmented governments, and 
deteriorating infrastructures (Goldfield and Brownell, 1990). In 
Charleston County, South Carolina, this decline posed economic 
and political challenges for the peninsular City of Charleston. As 
Map 1 shows, the city is geographically separated from some 
suburban development by two rivers and was prevented from 
annexation to the north by the 1972 incorporation of the City of 
North Charleston. To reverse the economic decline and to pre-
empt incorporation of other cities along its edge, Charleston in-
tensified its annexation efforts. 
When accelerated economic development in Charleston 
County began in the 1980s, competition between governmental 
jurisdictions increased as each attempted to exercise dominion 
over unincorporated areas. As the city increased annexation ef-
forts, suburban residents, public service districts, and the county 
organized resistance in order to preserve their independence and 
territorial integrity. Our case study of the metropolitan area of 
Charleston examines the strategies and conflicts associated with 
annexation and incorporation in order to explain the legal dimen-
sion of metropolitan growth and jurisdictional conflict. In par-
ticular, we examine two principal questions relating to the issue 
of annexation. First, how do urban regimes affect attempts to 
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annex? Second, how does interpretation of the law promote or 
inhibit a jurisdiction 's exercise of dominion? 
EXERCISING DOMINION 
Anthony Orum in Apprehending the City, sets forth 
propositions relating to rival jurisdictions and discusses the im-
portance of historical context in understanding political choices 
of cities seeking to exercise control over development. Accord-
ing to Orum, "cities as sovereign territorial systems engage in 
political action and struggles against other cities, as well as 
against rival political sovereignties" (Orum 1995, 24). Struggles 
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may be due to the desire to control land use as indicated by the 
NIMBY2 perspective , to maintain or increase revenues, and to 
exercise power over expenditures and policy. Suburban residents 
regard independence as the means to preserve a way of life. 
Public service districts view service sovereignty as a matter of 
survival. For cities, dominion becomes crucial when suburbani-
zation depletes their human and economic resources, contribut-
ing to a loss of revenue and a decline in city infrastructure . 
The effects of suburban migration were manifest in the 
City of Charleston as retail activity, housing developments, and 
middle class movement to unincorporated areas of the county. 
By 1976, the population of the peninsula was declining by about 
13% a year, over 25% of the population lived below the poverty 
level , unemployment for the unskilled was in double digits, and 
city revenues had declined by approximately 12% during the 
previous five years (Lundberg 1989, 1). The once thriving 
downtown of the city was vacant, and newly elected Mayor Jo-
seph Riley confronted the need for resources necessary to revi-
talize the city center. He simultaneously pursued two strategies: 
the development of a local economy and the annexation of sub-
urban property. 
~ The development of the tourism industry in the historic 
city was an option consistent with the character of the city and 
supported by evidence from other municipalities that pursued 
"the mayor's trophy collection"3 (Friedan and Sagalyn 1990, 
43-47). Revitalization in Charleston replicated these collections. 
Projects included the Omni Hotel (renamed Charleston Place), 
the restoration of commercial buildings, development of the old 
market place, a waterfront park, and construction of an aquar-
2
"Not in My Back Yard." 
3 
The "mayor's trophy collection" refers to capital projects intended to attract tourists and 
residents to areas to be revitalized . They include a festival marketplace, convention cen-
ter, river park, and/or aquarium . 
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ium. These projects demanded capital financing on a scale not 
previously seen by Charleston. Community Development Block 
Grants and Urban Development Action Grants provided the ini-
tial impetus for redevelopment and municipal bonds were issued 
to fund both rehabilitation of existing historical structures and 
new construction. Contributions from the private sector were 
sought and obtained. However, matching funds and local capital 
obligations required an infusion of revenues that could only be 
obtained through the extension of dominion over suburban areas 
through annexation. 
As the city pursued an aggressive annexation campaign , 
several obstacles inevitably led to conflict. Suburbanization cre-
ates regional development and enclaves that, in most instances , 
are geographically contiguous but "politically independent of the 
central city" (Kleniewski 1997, 96). However, the contiguity of 
landmass in the Charleston area is interrupted by rivers , harbors, 
and marsh . Consequently, suburban areas were geographically 
separated from the central city and separationist attitudes of sub-
urban residents intensified. Because development is inherently a 
"locational good" that does not distribute benefits equally 
(Swanstrom 1998, 280), suburban residents resent government 
actions that use their taxes to subsidize revitalization of other 
regions in the metropolitan area (Schneider 1992, 33-44). Resi-
dents who believed they would have no return from money in-
vested in the redevelopment of the city allied with elected and 
appointed officials of public service districts to resist the an-
nexation efforts of Charleston. Economic boosters allied with 
Mayor Riley (Whitson and Judd 1996, 151-152). 
URBAN REGIMES 
Urban regimes are coalitions of political actors who seek 
to dominate policy in the metropolitan area. Although the ex-
planatory value of regime theory is debated (Imbroscio 1998), 
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Clarence Stone argues that business interests can use substantial 
resources to become a "highly attractive partner in the govern-
ance of the city." Policy is a function of the "governing arrange-
ments" that are "shaped by the distribution of resources and their 
political use" (Stone 1998, 253 ). Anthony Orum states that "cit-
ies use individual actors or groups to carry out their purposes in 
pursuing dominance over their material environment or domin-
ion over rival political sovereignties, and individual actors as 
entrepreneurs use cities for their own specific ends as well" 
(Orum 1995, 24). Thus, coalitions form in order to influence 
policy. 
Local coalitions including business interests, organ-
izations such as the Chamber of Commerce, neighborhood asso-
ciations, and civic groups vary with respect to both resources and 
the scope of their interests. Regime, elite, and pluralist theorists 
offer different explanations for both the formation of coalitions 
and the power they exercise. However, most studies indicate that 
the most constant and influential actors in economic develop-
ment and land use policy are business groups, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and realtors.4 These groups formed an alliance with 
Mayor Riley in order to promote economic development, resto-
ration of the city center, and the enlargement of the city's juris-
diction. 
The success of the City of Charleston's urban regime 
and its annexation campaign is illustrated by the city's expansion 
between 1960 and 1998. Between 1960 and 1987, the city grew 
from an estimated 6.12 to 39.97 square miles. As Table 1 docu-
ments, the greatest growth has occurred since 1987. In the last 
twelve years, the city has annexed an additional 48.17 square 
4For an overview of community power see Thomas Dye, Politics in States and Commu-
nities, Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall (1994) and Lawrence J.R. Herson and John 
M. Bollard, The Urban Web, Chicago, 11: Nelson Hall Publishers (1998). 
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TABLE 1 
City of Charleston Annexation, 1987-1998 
Square 
Miles Square Housing Population 
Estimate Miles Units Estimate Persons 
Year January 1 Annexed Annexed January 1 Annexed 
1987 39.97 1.58 19 80,679 67 
1988 41.55 0.55 19 80,786 43 
1989 42.10 1.80 224 81,908 464 
1990 43.90 8.20 14 80,414* 124 
1991 52.10 18.20 17 81,432 31 
1992 70.30 1.80 1,916 82,207 4,463 
1993 72.10 0.67 1,472 87,372 4,011 
1994 72.77 0.40 441 92,249 1,069 
1995 73.17 13.80 262 94,140 682 
1996 87.00 0.27 238 95,679 576 
1997 87.27 0.87 267 97,793 674 
1998 88.14 0.66 73 100,122 144 
Source: Department of Planning and Urban Development, City of Charleston. 
*Census estimate. 
miles. The geographical expansion has led to a 20% increase in 
the population from 80,679 to over 100,000 persons. 
The city crossed the Ashley River in 1960 and began an-
nexation of the suburban areas of West Ashley. In the 1970s, it 
began to extend its jurisdiction to James Island. Then, in 1992, 
the city crossed the Cooper River to annex Daniel Island in 
neighboring Berkeley County. Although a portion of the annexed 
land was sparsely populated and consisted of marshland, the ap-
proach accomplished two objectives. First, it prevented the 
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neighboring cities of Mt. Pleasant and North Charleston from 
acquiring adjacent land. Second, it resulted in the annexation of 
corridors that would prevent incorporation of edge cities. The 
strategy had two major impacts. First it limited the resources ri-
val jurisdictions could command and second, it produced a 
source of revenue that Charleston could use for its revitalization 
efforts. 
While suburban neighborhood associations and civic 
groups do not necessarily oppose economic growth, they are fre-
quently concerned with the distribution of resources and/or po-
litical independence from the central city. As the city continued 
to annex, residents and the James Island and St. Andrews Public 
Service Districts increasingly became concerned that their re-
sources would be siphoned and their power diluted. They formed 
coalitions and developed strategies to defend suburban inde-
pendence. These strategies included information campaigns de-
signed to discourage residents from joining the city; law suits 
challenging annexations, and an attempt to create a separate mu-
nicipality. 
RlvAL JURISDICTIONS AND DOMINION 
Historically, annexation has been a popular means by 
which cities have added territory and population and thereby ex-
panded the tax base. Two factors affect the ability of cities to 
annex. The first is state law. In general, annexation law in South 
Carolina is considered restrictive. South Carolina has lagged be-
hind most of the other rapidly growing sunbelt states in modify-
ing its annexation laws; several other sunbelt states liberalized 
their annexation laws in the 1970s. Cities in South Carolina have 
only three methods by which they may annex (see Figure 1). The 
method of annexation depends upon the number of acres and 
individually owned properties to be annexed. The 75% petition 
method is too constraining unless the area is largely undeveloped 
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FIGURE 1 
Means of Annexation in South Carolina 
(1) The 75% Petition Method by Ordinance. Any area which is 
contiguous to a municipality may be annexed by the filing of a 
petition signed by at least 75% of the freeholders who own at 
least 75% of the assessed valuation of the real property in the 
area. The annexation is complete if the council enacts an ordi-
nance declaring the area to be annexed to the municipality . No 
election is needed 
(2) The 100% Petition Method by Ordinance. Any area which 
is contiguous to a municipality may be annexed by the filing of a 
petition signed by all property owners in the area. The annexation 
is complete upon adoption of an ordinance by council. 
(3) The Special Ordinance Method. Special ordinance methods 
exist for property owned by the municipality, county, school dis-
trict, federal and state government, a corporation, church or re-
ligious group and for property in street or highway. 
and controlled by a few owners; in this instance, the number of 
petitioners may exceed the challengers by the requisite number 
of signatures and the method may be viable. The special ordi-
nance procedure for annexation of public entities is seldom used 
because the governing bodies must submit a petition and they are 
usually not inclined to relinquish any sovereignty. The 100% 
method may be used when an area is well developed because 
each property owner who petitions by this method cannot be 
challenged . Consequently, the 100% method is the principle 
means used by the City of Charleston to acquire additional terri-
tory. 
The second factor with which a city must contend in an-
nexation decisions is rival jurisdictions ; there may be other in-
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corporated entities adjacent to the city such as public service 
districts serving the unincorporated areas. In the case of 
Charleston, Mt. Pleasant and North Charleston border the city to 
the East and North respectively and all three jurisdictions com-
pete for control over adjacent unincorporated areas. On the 
south, Charleston borders the Atlantic Ocean. Early annexation 
by Charleston was to the west and southwest into the area identi-
fied as West Ashley and the James Island, served by public 
service districts. More recently, the city has moved further 
southwest onto Johns Island and northeast into part of the Cain-
hoy Peninsula that lies between North Charleston and Mt. Pleas-
ant. Charleston has aggressively met challenges from rival 
jurisdictions through hostile annexations and an interpretation of 
the law that enables to city to carve corridors or annex one prop-
erty at a time. The city alternately relies on the 75- and 100% 
annexation methods available under South Carolina law as cir-
cumstance dictates. 
Charleston's first excursion west of the Ashley River oc-
curred in 1960. Relying on the majority petition and election 
procedure then in effect, the city annexed two unincorporated 
areas served by the St. Andrews Public Service District. A suit 
challenging the action was filed and reviewed by the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina in 1961. Appellants argued that the 
Public Service District was a municipal corporation, that an-
nexation of a portion of the corporation was illegal, that the areas 
annexed were not contiguous with the City of Charleston, and 
that the annexation precluded "compactness and unity required 
of municipal corporations." The Court, however, ruled that "[the] 
public service district was not a municipal corporation, within 
contemplation of [the] annexation statute, and annexation of 
portion thereof to city was not invalid even though the question 
of annexation was submitted to voters of only those portions of 
district which were proposed to be annexed." The Court further 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
EXERCISING DOMINION OVER METROPOLITAN GROWTH 11 
held that the annexation statute did not "limit the extent or shape 
of the territory" nor did the river "constitute a barrier to complete 
amalgamation of the communities upon its opposite banks" (To-
vey v. City of Charleston, 237 S.C. 475; 117 S.E.2d872, 1961). 
The Tovey case set a precedent for subsequent annexation on ad-
jacent islands. 
Public service districts and residents continued to oppose 
the encroachment of Charleston and, in 1988, the state Supreme 
Court reviewed an appeal that consolidated five separate legal 
challenges from residents and the James Island and St. Andrews 
Public Service Districts. The James Island public service district 
was a party in four of the five actions. St. Andrews joined James 
Island in one case and filed a separate action in another case. 
These cases argued that water and marsh precluded the homoge-
neity, unity, and compactness of the City of Charleston. There-
fore, annexations west of the Ashley River filed to meet the test 
of contiguity. Each of the five annexations had been invalidated 
by a circuit court but the Supreme Court reversed the opinions. 
The Court held that "the statutory word 'contiguous ' must be 
afforded its ordinary meaning of 'touching' ... the fact that [an 
area] shares a common boundary with the annexing municipality 
is sufficient" (Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408; 368 
S.E.2d 899, 1988). 
In 1992, the city moved northeast with its annexation of 
Daniel Island, which borders the Cooper River. Relying on the 
precedent set in the Tovey case, three jurisdictions could claim 
contiguity with Daniel Island: Charleston, North Charleston, and 
Mt. Pleasant. While each were initially involved in negotiations 
with the Guggenheim Foundation, the sole owner of the island, 
Charleston moved for a hostile takeover with the assistance of 
one of the city's principal policy actors, Griffith Reality, which 
has had a long standing relationship with the Mayor and the city. 
VOL. 27 1999 
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Geography, the interpretation and application of the law, 
and an urban alliance contributed to the successful annexation of 
the disputed property. If the Guggenheim Foundation did not 
agree, annexation could be forced through the 75% method. 
However, this method relied upon property owners' cooperation 
on two other islands, Parker and Rhodens. Charleston viewed the 
three islands in combination as constituting one landmass sepa-
rated only by the transparency of water. Property owners of 
Rhodens Island petitioned for annexation giving the city two 
signatures; the Griffith family agreed to the annexation of Parker 
Island giving the city ten signatures; the Guggenheim Founda-
tion had a disputed two or three signatures. Thus, the city was 
poised for a hostile takeover and, in a called meeting of the 
council, held the first reading of the ordinance.5 To avoid court 
costs associated with the disputed signatures, the Foundation 
requested information from the city about both its bond rating 
and its service ability. The Foundation finally agreed to annexa-
tion. Daniel Island was annexed through the 100% petition 
method. Parker Island was not annexed; Rhodens Island was. 
The South Carolina statute also provides for the annexa-
tion of property owned by the state or federal governments in-
cluding public roads. According to the law, 
Whenever the whole or any part of any street, road-
way or highway has been accepted for and is under 
permanent public maintenance by a city, a county or 
the State Highway Department, that portion of any 
right-of-way area not exceeding the width thereof 
lying beyond but abutting on the corporate limits of 
the city may be annexed to and incorporated within 
the city by adoption of an ordinance so declaring, 
without necessity for election of any sort (S. C. Code 
Ann. section 5-3-110,1976) . 
5lnformation relating to annexation policy and procedure was obtained from interviews 
with Ernest Andrade , Annexation Officer for the City of Charleston , on March 5 and May 
21, 1999. 
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Municipalities are only required to obtain consent from 
the public agency that maintains the road . Charleston has used 
public roads in order to meet contiguity requirements . Use of 
roads allows the city to extend its jurisdiction over individual 
properties within a subdivision through the 100% petition 
method. While contiguity is not apparent because houses on ei-
ther side of the one or two houses annexed by the city remain in 
the area served by the public service district , the annexation does 
meet the conditions set forth in law. Consequently , municipalities 
that have aggressive policies can increase their dominion incre-
mentally. 
Charleston adopted an information campaign strategy to 
win homeowners to the prospect of annexation. The annexat ion 
officer of Charleston, following guidelines established by the 
Municipal Association of South Carolina (Kearney 1999, 9), sent 
information to suburban residents citing advantages of city serv-
ices and taxes as compared to public service districts. One by 
one, homeowners joined the city. Although the service districts 
opposed these policies and countered with their own information 
campaign, an estimated 10,000 of the 30,000 residents of James 
Island now reside in the city and about 45,000 of the 60,000 
people west of the Ashley River now live within the city 's juris-
diction. As Table 2 shows , the City Department of Planning and 
Urban Development estimates the 1998 population growth of 
Charlest on to be approximately 2,828 persons. Currently, the 
greater development within the city is occurring on Daniel Is-
land, the Cainhoy Peninsula , and James Island respectively . 
Therefore, population losses on the peninsula of Charleston are 
countered by substantial gains in other regions as developers in 
conjunction with the city continue to build new residential areas. 
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TABLE2 
Population Growth, City of Charleston, 1997-1998 
1997 1998 Absolute Percent 
Region Population Population Change Change 
Peninsu la 39,105 39,081 -24 <1.0 
West Ashley 47 ,656 49,021 1,365 3.0 
James Island 11,418 12,565 1,147 10.0 
Johns Island 1,598 1,731 133 8.0 
Daniel Islancl/Cainhoy 346 553 207 60.0 
Total 100,123 102,951 2,828 2.8 
Source: Department of Planning and Urban Development , City of Charleston . 
Note: Estimates include annexations and new residential construction/demolition 
perm its. 
INCORPORATION AND DOMINION 
14 
Another challenge to annexation is the incorporation of 
new cities. Charleston was the first city to be incorporated in 
South Carolina when it was issued a charter on June 23, 1722. 
The charter, proposed by the first appointed colonial governor, 
Sir Francis Nicholson , reportedly was modeled after the charter 
of New York City. In 1783, the General Assembly passed an act 
creating Charleston as a municipal subdivision (Graham and 
Moore 1994, 204). Originally, cities were incorporated under 
general act charters approved by the General Assembly. When 
the South Carolina Constitution was revised in 1973, cities were 
granted home rule and Section 8 of Article VIII mandated that 
the General Assembly provide by general law the method by 
which new municipalities could be incorporated. The section 
further provided that the incorporation of a new city could occur 
only " ... with the consent of a majority of the electors voting in 
such election who reside in and are entitled by law to vote within 
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the district proposed to be incorporated." The Home Rule statute 
adopted by the General Assembly allowed the Secretary of State 
to issue a certificate of incorporation when the region to be in-
corporated has 
(1) a population density of at least 300 persons per 
square mile except for the sea islands and coastal ar-
eas within two miles of the Atlantic Ocean. 
(2) no territory within five miles of an active inco:rpo-
rated municipality. 
(3) filed a feasible plan for providing for municipal 
services (Underwood 1989, 202). 
When the proposed municipality has a population of 
more than 15,000 or has petitioned the nearest city or town for 
annexation and has been refused, the five-mile rule is not appli-
cable. However, when the Secretary of State issues a certificate 
of incorporation for the new city, the procedures can be chal-
lenged by suit within 60 days of the certification. Thus, when the 
Town of James Island was incorporated, the City of Charleston 
immediately filed a suit challenging the legality of the procedure. 
In the fall of 1992, residents in the unincorporated area 
of James Island voted for incorporation and the Town of James 
Island was certified by the Secretary of State. As a barrier island, 
petitioners were exempt from the population density provision. 
The five-mile limit was avoided because the total population of 
the area to be incorporated exceeded 15,000. In its suit, however, 
the City of Charleston argued that the population requirement 
was met only because the geographical area of the town illegally 
crossed waterways and marshes that had previously been an-
nexed by the city. The Town of James Island argued that water-
ways considered transparent for the purpose of annexation could 
be considered transparent for incorporation, and that publicly-
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owned marshland did not constitute a legal barrier to contiguity 
necessary for the town to meet the population requirements. 
Thus , if marsh and waterways were no barrier to annexation, 
they were no barriers to incorporati on. 
Three years lapsed before a South Carolina Circuit Court 
of Appeals heard the case. Because the town had functioned as a 
corporate entity during this period, it claimed de facto status as a 
municipality . The issue of de facto municipal status together with 
the question of contiguity provided the legal basis for the con-
tentions of the disputing parties. The circuit court held in favor 
of the plaintiff , the City of Charleston. Town of James Island 
appealed. In 1996, the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed 
the case and considered four questions: First , "did the [circuit] 
court err in finding that the Town lacked the requisite contigu-
ity?" Second, "was the action properly /timely instituted under" 
South Carolina law? Third , do respondents have standing? And 
fourth, "did the Court err in finding [the] Town was not a de 
facto municipal corporation? " 
The Supreme Court found that the action was timely and 
respondents had standing . The court then reviewed the questions 
of contiguity and de facto status. With respect to contiguity, the 
Court, citing Tovey, held that "contiguity is not destroyed by 
water or marshlands which separate parcels of highland. " How-
ever, the court found that argument made by James Island disre-
garded "the fact that the waters/wetlands it seeks to use to 
establish contiguity have already been annexed by another mu-
nicipality." Turning to the question of the de facto municipal 
corporation , the Court declined "to confer the status of a de facto 
municipality simply due to the length of the appeal" ( Glaze v. 
Grooms, 324 S.C. 249; 478 S.E.2d 841, 1996). 
Having successfully challenged the incorporation of the 
Town of James Island, Charleston effectively eliminated one bar-
rier to its dominion over the island. Immediately following the 
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court 's decision, the city sent letters to unincorporated property 
holders explaining the advantages of annexation. The advantages 
included, according to the city, lower taxes. The James Island 
public service district countered with a letter stating that the dis-
trict was solvent and that residents who did not wish to be an-
nexed did not have to fear losing service. Since the initial effort 
to increase its jurisdiction , the city has pursued annexation, 
property by property, often through the 100% annexation method 
that enables one home owner at a time to petition for annexation. 
CONCLUSION 
Although South Carolina annexation law is considered 
restrictive, aggressive annexation strategies of municipalities can 
overcome barriers to the expansion of their jurisdictions. As cit-
ies test the limits of the law, legal refinement may actually act as 
a facilitator as opposed to a barrier to the exercise of dominion 
through annexation. The aggressive strategies of Charleston have 
contributed to such refinement. In its successful defense of legal 
challenges to annexations, the city has been instrumental in ob-
taining definitions of the law that more liberally construe the 
meaning of the words found in the state statutes. 
First is the meaning of "contiguity." While residents may 
define contiguity as high ground that is adjacent to the munici-
pality, court interpretations have found that water and marsh are 
essentially transparent and therefore off er no legal impediment to 
the annexation of property. Consequently, suburbs and public 
service districts no longer have a legal argument that will serve 
to combat encroachment of a city that has adopted an aggressive 
campaign to extend its dominion. Thus, both the sense of isola-
tion afforded by rivers and the legal basis the rivers offered for 
continued independence of suburban areas has been consistently 
eroded. 
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Second are the meanings of "unity" and "compactness." 
Courts have held that size and irregular shape of property do not 
violate the statutory provision for the enlargement of municipal 
boundaries. Furthermore, the South Carolina statute permits the 
annexation of roads and bridges that provide access from one 
region to another, thereby satisfying the contiguity requirement. 
Therefore, the statute and its interpretation enable cities to in-
crementally annex property through the 100% petition method, 
although continuity is not readily apparent to all suburban resi-
dents. 
The application of the law as suited to the circumstance 
may give the aggressive city an advantage over adjacent munici-
palities. When aided by an urban regime that has control over a 
substantial portion of the property to be annexed, the city, using 
the 7 5% method, can force an annexation of land for which sev-
eral jurisdictions may be competing. Cities that form alliances 
with entrepreneurs obtain substantial support for increasing their 
dominion over metropolitan growth. 
Cities may also use the law to carve corridors through 
unincorporated land and thereby prevent the incorporation of 
edge cities. With court rulings relating to water and marsh, the 
annexing jurisdiction does not need to contend with reluctant 
property owners in order to effectively divide landmass and pre-
empt challenges to subsequent efforts to annex. The same princi-
ple applies in the use of public roads and the 100% annexation 
method that link the city to parcels of land otherwise separated 
by unincorporated areas within a given geographical region. 
Although South Carolina state law governing annexation 
is restrictive, a willingness to test laws governing both annexa-
tion and incorporation coupled with urban regimes and aggres-
sive policies enable cities to challenge effectively efforts of other 
jurisdictions to maintain or extend their dominion. While these 
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policies inevitably create political conflict, cities that have a well 
defined metropolitan growth plan and annexation policy can ex-
tend their jurisdiction over areas that are developed or develop-
ing. 
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